AMPTP Tactics Don't Fool Anybody

(The post below was written by WGA Board member Nick Kazan)

If the consequences weren�t so tragic, it would be pretty comical to see the Companies mocking our Executive Director David Young for never having made a deal in Hollywood. Of course he has made deals for us, four of them (including the Comedy Central deal and the �Family Guy� game deal), but yeah, he�s never before negotiated a contract with the AMPTP.

Call me crazy, but I think that�s a good thing, because it means he�s never made a lousy deal, never made a sweetheart deal; he�s never been chummy with Nick Counter, and he refuses to bend over and give them what they want and expect. He�s not part of their club. Thank God.

They also suggest that David doesn�t understand the issues and the town. Understand what? This is brain surgery? Our central issue, the Internet, just isn�t that complicated. It doesn�t take a genius or a labor negotiator to see what�s happening or why it�s important. In fact, pretty much the whole country gets it � which is why pretty much the whole country seems to be on our side.

You may have also noticed that in their Friday statement, they don�t call our team negotiators, they call them �organizers.� So? Yeah, we�re organized �like we�ve never been before � and that scares them. But the implication behind their smear tactics (that our leaders are crazy) reflects the opposite of the truth: we�re the ones who�ve tried to be flexible.

Our original proposal on the Internet gave the Conglomerates precisely what they said they wanted: not a fixed residual but a flexible system � so that if there was (as they claimed) little or no revenue, there would pay little or nothing in residuals. Our proposal was simple: 2.5% of revenue.

When they changed their mind and offered a fixed residual formula, we tried to accommodate that model and made a fixed-revenue counter-proposal. Our reward for flexibility? They claimed we were demanding more than they would earn and they walked out.

We�re in a peculiar position. The companies themselves are run by intelligent thoughtful people who are normally our creative partners. The AMPTP, on the other hand, is run by Nick Counter � a bully. He�s used to getting his way, and he thinks his archaic game plan will still work.

The paradox here is that for the companies there is, or ought to be, a financial calculus: the strike is costing them more than a settlement. But Nick Counter doesn�t care about their bottom line. He only cares about �winning� the deal � even if, as has happened in the past, the companies lose in the long run.

One final observation: some writers are still unaware that the Companies must agree unanimously on every one of their proposals. This means that in most circumstances, the hardliners carry the day and effectively blackmail the other companies.

But it also means that the hardliners (who presumably are less affected by the strike) can do very considerable damage to the bottom line of their competitors.

For instance, a wild hypothetical: if the strike should severely depress the stock price of CBS, Time Warner, which does not own a major network and is rumored to be a hawk in these negotiations � could gobble it up.

So the AMPTP is a very peculiar marriage � to say the least.